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I.

Introduction

Since 1950, the demand for water has more than doubled in the United States.
Historically, growing demands have been met by increasing reservoir capacity and
groundwater mining, often at the expense of environmental and cultural concerns. The
future is expected to hold much of the same. Demand for water will continue to increase,
particularly in response to the expanding urban sector, while growing concerns about the
environment are prompting interest in allocating more water for in-stream uses, and
cultural issues will remain at the fore. So, where will this water come from? Virtually all
water supplies are allocated. Providing for new users requires a reduction in the amount
of water dedicated to existing users and a mechanism for transferring water between
users.
Markets typically are formed to facilitate the efficient allocation of goods and services.
Under simple conditions buyers and sellers pursuing their own self-interest willingly
agree upon a single price that fully compensates sellers and provides the commodity to
those who value it highest6. The general concept of water marketing (here taken to mean
a permanent transfer of a water right) and water leasing/banking (a temporary transfer)
has gained considerable attention as a volunteer, market-mediated system for transferring
water between competing uses.
A sampling of investigations into water marketing where the focus in upon the formal
trading of rights (as against leasing) can be found in Howe et al (1986), Burness and
Quirk (1980), Simpson (1994), Saliba (1987), Easter (1999), Easter et al (1999), Colby
(1993), Colby (2000), Howe and Goemans (2003) and Brookshire et al (2005). Often
water marketing is viewed as movement from agricultural use to urban uses, which are
typically viewed as permanent.
Formal market transfers are also often slow, and do not necessarily increase the flexibility
of water users to trade quickly in response to near terms shortages and thus they do not
directly address the need for a trading mechanism that can rapidly respond to climatic
induced needs.
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It cannot be emphasized enough that any transfer of water within a market-based system is a voluntary
transfer.

Water Banking/leasing approaches have been set forth as one possibility for addressing
the increasing needs and the possibility of reallocation within and across current uses, in
a timely fashion. The Water 2025: Preventing Crises and Conflict in the West (2005)
calls for consideration of market-based principles in the context of existing institutional
structures7. The New Mexico State Water plan also calls for an efficient water transfer
plan (Office of the State Engineer (2003)). The New Mexico plan specifically supports
water transfers as a strategic management tool for efficient water transfers inclusive of
water banks8. Specifically, the State Engineer is responsible for implementation and
encourages the creations of water banks in areas that are experiencing shortages.
A recent report details the limited nature of water leasing/banking in the Western U.S.
(West Water Research (2004)). The report provides an analysis of water banking
legislation policies and programs in 12 Western states. There are 23 active water banks of
which seven are market based pricing, meaning that the price is negotiated between the
buyer and the seller with one bank having online negotiations. The other 16 banks are
fixed pricing or administrative pricing schemes that are set annually. Length of
transaction varies and the number of transactions is limited annually.
Here we explore the role of water leasing/banking in allocating resources among
competing demands. In particular, we develop a stylized template for temporary
voluntary transfers amongst competing uses (agriculture, Native American farming,
environmental interests, urban interests) on the Middle Rio Grande. There are many
issues (engineering, physical, legal, and institutional) to be addressed in allowing for
water transfers within a basin. Central to our effort is linking of a
hydrological/engineering/institutional model that allows for water transfers to be
evaluated within the various frameworks.
II.

Objectives

In our initial framework, we represent one physical component by tracking evaporation
associated with trades up and down the river. Our stylized template allows for future
exploration of different physical, hydrological, engineering, spatial resolutions, market
systems, legal institutions and priority frameworks, option trading through time, various
representations of uncertainty, and different frameworks for third-party effects. The
model design allows behavioral experiments to be conducted with subjects from key
water use sectors to test how a voluntary water banking/leasing exchange process might
operate.
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III.

Approach
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IV.

Physical Setting

The Middle Rio Grande of central New Mexico (Figure 2) is characterized by basin and
range topography with mountains along the east, and arid valleys and mesas to the central
and west. The principle drainage for the basin is the Rio Grande, which is the primary
source of irrigation water for the region’s farmers.
Municipal demands are met though pumping of deep
alluvial aquifers that are directly connected with the
Rio Grande River. Vegetation classes found within the
region range from riparian along the Rio Grande to
desert grassland, pinyon-juniper woodlands and mixed
coniferous forest at higher mountain elevations. The
planning region includes Albuquerque, the principal
urban center of New Mexico, and several smaller
communities including Rio Rancho, Belen, Los Lunas,
Socorro and Bernalillo. These communities are
located along the Rio Grande, while sparse rural
populations characterizing the outlying areas. From
1900 to 2000 the population of this region grew from
about 51,000 to about 713,000 (a 1298% increase),
according to the U.S. Census Bureau. The most recent doubling of population occurred
from about 1970 to 2000.
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V.

System Dynamics

The water leasing/banking model is formulated within a system dynamics context.
System dynamics provides a unique mathematical framework for integrating the natural
Stock
and social processes important to
Flow
managing natural resources, while
providing an interactive interface for
W a te r _ L e v e l
engaging the public in the decision
I n flo w
O u tf lo w
process. System dynamics is formulated
on a spatially aggregated, temporally
dynamic basis (i.e., lumped parameter
In
O ut
model). Simply put, these models track
Lines of
the temporal trends in key system
Auxiliary
Feedback
Variable
commodities (e.g., surface/groundwater)
resulting from variable inflows and
Figure 3. Schematic of simple system dynamics stock
outflows (see Figure 3). These “flows”
and flow diagram.
are modeled by way of historic data,
empirical relations, analytical models, or from the output of spatially disaggregated
models. Stocks and flows rarely operate independently but rather in a system of feedback
and time delays.
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VI.

Physical Model Structure

Reach

The physical/engineering model is developed within the commercial system dynamics
software package, Powersim Studio 2003. The model is designed to operate on a yearly
time step. The model is structured according to 6 interacting reaches, as delineated by the
major gages on the Rio Grande. Rio Grande inflows, tributary inflows and climatic
conditions taken from
Mainstem inflow
historical records define the
Upstream gage
external forcing applied to
Tributary inflows
the model. In this way,
Local inflows
simulations can be run for
Agricultural
Canal GW gains
dry, average, or wet years
diversions
with either high or low
Depletions
- Agricultural use
Channel Losses
reservoir storage. The
- Crop deep percolation
- Evaporation
Canal
losses
model then calculates the
- Leakage to groundwater
Agricultural
- Riparian evapotranspiration
returns
basic water balance
components for each reach
Through flow
Downstream gage
of the model. The basic
Reach Outflow
water balance terms are
given in Figure 4. These
Figure 4. Schematic of generic reach showing the key water budget
terms are calculated by way
terms calculated by the hydrologic/engineering model.
of empirical models,
analytical models, or through mass balance calculations. For each time step, two model
runs are performed. During the first run the model calculates river flows, conveyance
losses, and available irrigation water. This information is supplied to the
leasing/behavioral model. When a trading period ends, the water balance is re-calculated
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with the physical/engineering model. The second run of the model then calculates
impacts of the trades on the hydraulic system.
VII.

Market/Behavioral Model: Water Leasing/Banking Exchange Design

We utilize an open market trading system similar to the system used to trade other
commodities such as wheat, corn, pork bellies and metals. Specifically, we employ a
system known as a double oral auction. Buyers and sellers declare their bids and offers to
the market. Contracts are established when a buyer and a seller agree on a standing price.
The market is open for a fixed amount of time. Time in the experiment consists of a
series of years, during which the market for water occurs during the six months of the
growing season. There are four classes of participants in a leasing experiment. The
participants (subjects in the experiments) represent the interests of specific users,
including agricultural, Native Americans, urban interests, and environmental interests.
Each agent represents the interests of one of these four user groups in a single reach of
the model. Trades are allowed
between reaches and within
reaches. Subjects are motivated by
monetary reward in the
experiments and are paid based on
profits earned through the leasing
of water or by obtaining their
yearly payoff based on their water
use. We are not conducting
simulations rather we are assuming Figure 5. Depiction of stylized river
the participants in the experiments
maximize profits based on their underlying payoff functions. The experiment is based on
the engineering model with a stylized river. The river flows from reach 1 to reach 6
(Figure 5). Using Powersim Studio 2003 water reduction factors are calculated for the
four different classes of experiments.
VIII. Utility Functions
Each water user group is motivated by a utility function unique to their needs.
Agricultural/Native American users require three acre-feet of water during the growing
season for their crops. Failure to obtain this minimum amount of water results in
complete failure of their crop for the season. Excess amounts do not increase the crop
payoffs but can be leased out for monetary gain. Players have the option of leasing their
water instead of growing a crop, or if they are unable to obtain sufficient quantities of
water for a crop. The urban region within the model represents Albuquerque. For this
user, it is assumed that water produces value in ever increasing amounts but is subject to
the law of diminishing marginal utility. For this reason, we model the urban payoff to
water using a quadratic specification. Environmental uses of water are assumed to be for
minnow protection and riparian restoration. These demands are modeled by a set of
preferences that depend upon maintaining a minimum of two acre-feet of water in the
river. Below this minimum, environmental losses occur. Above the minimum, positive
Environmental outcomes are forthcoming.
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Figure 6 shows the demand functions for the three user groups. The demand functions
for agricultural/Native American farming and environmental interests are a step demand
function while the urban user has a downward sloping demand curve.
Agricultural/Native American users seeking to maximize monetary payout will be willing
to pay up to (b/a) to obtain (a) units of water. The Environmental user’s demand function
is also a step function. The environmental user is willing to pay up to (c/b) to obtain (b)
units of water. However, the environmental user receives a negative payoff if they allow
water in the river to drop below a threshold of (b) units. This effectively models
environmental concerns such as silvery minnow protection in the Middle Rio Grande.
The urban user faces a downward sloping demand curve to model the idea of diminishing
marginal returns.
Agricultural/Native
American

Environmental

Urban

Market Demand
1

2

3

Figure 6. The three different water user groups are summed to create a market demand in order to
develop the efficiency price. Q1 represents a dry water scenario, Q2 a normal water scenario and
Q3 a wet water scenario.

Deleted: Red
Deleted: black
Deleted: blue

Multiplying the agricultural/Native American demand function by the number of players
(n), environmental by the number of players (n) and the Urban by the number of players
(n), then summing creates a market demand curve, the diagram on the far right of Figure
6. Using the experimentally set market supply and the market demand that comes from
the aggregation of the three demand functions, an equilibrium or efficiency price can be
calculated as the intersection of the market supply and the market demand. This allows
the observed experimental prices to be compared to the efficiency price in order to
determine if the market is efficient.
Three different climatic scenarios are also represented in Figure 6 with red (Q1)
representing a dry climatic scenario, black (Q2) representing a normal climatic scenario
and blue (Q3) representing a wet climatic scenario. The different climatic scenarios are
the market supply of water, with the intersection of the aggregate demand curve being the
efficiency price for the market.
IX.

Experiments

The market experiments are conducted through a series of bidding sessions. In these
sessions information from the physical/engineering model is passed to participants via a
web interface. Water users may enter bid quantities and prices to sell or buy a unit of
water, or they may accept specific offers at one-unit increments. The web interface
checks to make sure both the buyer and seller each have sufficient amounts of money and
water, and then determines if the transfer is possible using loss estimates from the
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physical/engineering model. Other potential constraints on a trade include water
availability, Rio Grande Compact compliance, and/or Minimum River flow requirements.
When a trade is made, the accepted bid or offer disappears from the bid/offer sheet.
Buyers and sellers are free to update their bids and offers throughout the duration of the
trading year. At the end of the year, the compact balance is checked and the hydrological
model is recalibrated based upon the contracts impact on water flows. Bidding is
concluded when all bidders have bought or sold as needed, some set number of transfers
have been refused, or a fixed time limit is exceeded. All trades are voluntary.
X.

Results

Fourteen experiments were
Water Reduction for Different Treatments
conducted over the summer
1.3
of 2005; 3 decreasing
Normal
1.1
scenarios, 3 increasing
Water
scenarios, 3 dry scenarios,
Dry
Reduction 0.9
3 normal scenarios, 1 above
Increasing
Factor
normal scenario and 1
0.7
Decreasing
below normal scenario.
Scenarios were developed
0.5
by coupling the physical
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
(hydrological) model with
Trading Year
the engineering model.
Figure 7. Four different climatic scenarios
The water reduction factors
for the experiments are
shown in Figure 7. For example, in the decreasing water scenario the Agricultural/Native
American user begins trading year 1 with 3.75 acre feet of water which is above the 3
acre feet required to grow a crop
Weighted Average Price Path for Decreasing Water
for the trading year. Over the
Scenarios (Exp 1,2,3)
course of the trading years, water
14
becomes scarce. In year 10 the
12
Exp 1
user begins the trading year with
10
1.45 acre-feet of water. The
Price
Exp 2
water reduction factor was used
per 8
acre
to calculate the allocation for
6
Exp 3
foot
each user. Results show that the
4
weighted average price obtained
Ef f iciency
2
in the experiment is above the
0
efficiency price calculated from
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
the demand functions (Figure 8).
Trading year
The model also proved to be
robust as all users engaged in
Figure 8. Weighted average price in relation to efficiency
multiple trades during each
price
trading year.
Trading of water was observed both between reaches and within reaches. The current
model only has one representative per user type on a reach (i.e. only one environmental
user per reach). Even with a single representative, the results have shown that trading
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occurs amongst the user groups
and within the user groups.
Figure 9 shows how water was
traded for the
12
Agricultural/Native American
10
Environmental
user during one decreasing
water scenario (experiment 1).
8
Farmer/Native
As can be seen, most of the
Acre
6
Am erican
Feet
trading occurs between the user
Urban
4
group itself, with very few
trades occurring with the urban
2
user. As water became scarce,
0
the number of trades engaged
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
in by the Agricultural/Native
Trading Year
American group declined.
Figure 10 shows that although
Figure 9. Agricultural/Native American trading of water
the number of trades declined
for this user group the amount of water traded increased as water became scarce. Results
show that Agricultural/Native American users leased water in dry years to obtain
monetary benefits rather than grow a crop. The initial allocation of water for this user
group is the point zero in Figure 10. The negative percentage means that farmers are net
sellers of water.
Who Agricultural/Nativ e American sells water
to

Environmental users
P erc ent of I nit ial A lloc at ion f or F arm ers / N at iv e
A m eric an
benefited the most in a
decreasing water scenario, as
5
they became net purchasers
of water. The market system
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
-5
is able to meet environmental
concerns such as protecting
Per cent -15
the silvery minnow and
farmers were able to make a
-25
positive monetary reward by
selling water to these users.
-35
The model is also able to
T r ading Year
track water movement
Figure 10. Agricultural/Native Americans percentage of
between reaches and user
initial allocation
groups. A priori expectations
are that water would be traded upstream due to the effect of evaporation. Thus, water
that would have been lost to evaporation can be saved through the trading of water from
the lower reaches to the upper reaches. Results from the experiments have shown this to
be true.
Figure 11 is a representation of the stylized river before a trading year (left side) and after
a trading year (right side). The result shows the 7th round of a decreasing water scenario.
To determine water movement by reach it was necessary to aggregate total water in each
reach. Summing each user’s water allotment by each reach did this. Since the
Environmental user’s initial water allotment is below the minimum flow requirement
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needed to protect riparian interest and the silvery minnow, they purchase water since they
are facing a monetary punishment if they allow the
Net Effect
river to fall below this threshold. This explains why
1
1
the results show a positive gain in the lower reaches
-2.54
of the river in figure 11, as there is only an
Agricultural and Environmental user in reaches 4 and
2
2
5 with only an Environmental user in reach 6. The
+ 0.34
Environmental users in the lower reaches are
purchasers of water because of the demand functions
they face as shown in figure 6.
3
+1.49
3

4

+0.14

5

+0.19

4

5

+0.38
6

6

Not only were these outcomes realized from the
experiment, it was also observed that participants are
able to handle the cognitive complexity of trading in
a complex water market subject to exogenous
hydrological forces. Multiple trading was observed
in each experiment run showing that participants
comprehend the cognitive complexity of the model
and that the model is robust.
XI.

Extensions

This model is merely a starting point, where any
possibly climatic scenario and its affect upon
behavior can be modeled. Further research to be
conducted will have real farmers play the role of the
agricultural agent, along with Native Americans,
Environmentalists, and Urban consumers playing their respective role. This will allow
for water and its role in the culture of acequias to be more accurately modeled and
included in later experiments. Currently third party effects are not included in the model;
including such effects will introduce solution concepts for these situations. The current
economic model is a double oral auction; other models will be examined as a way of
conducting trades. Examination of intertemporal trading-both within years and between
years will be incorporated into the model. The inclusion of transaction costs, modeling
laterals, and the use of a central planner in the model will also be explored as extensions
or variations to the current economic model.
Figure 11. Representation of the
stylized river before and after
trading with the net effect for each
reach.
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